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Morten Ziethen
Taking the Turn From Within
– Heidegger’s Kehre reconsidered 
in light of the Seinsfrage 
Heidegger’s turn is often explained, slogan-wise, as a shift in focus 
from Dasein to Sein – a shift often associated with a shift from ac-
tivity to passivity, from man throwing meaning into an open future 
(Heidegger before the turn) to man as receiving meaning from Being 
(Heidegger after the turn). On this background, many have seen the 
late Heidegger as one of the pioneers of postmodernism, replacing 
man’s autonomy with an opaque (but talking/meaning-giving) force 
called Being, leading to a dehumanization of man by the denial of 
man’s ability to be responsible and accountable for his actions and 
intentions. On this background, the evaluation of Heidegger’s late 
philosophy has not been univocal. Firstly, modernists such as Pip-
pin1 or Habermas2 have been able to hear the marching steps from 
the German soldiers in the thinking of the late Heidegger, whereby 
Heidegger’s gehören (listening to) is interpreted as gehorchen (submit-
ting and obeying). In other words: They interpret Heidegger’s turn as 
a turn away from rationality, autonomy and enlightenment and back 
to a more rural and irrational understanding of subjectivity. Second-
ly, right-Heideggerians3 have praised the more passive descriptions of 
man in Heidegger’s late philosophy and used it to read the late phi-
losophy as an attempt to reenchant the world vis-à-vis a view on man 
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as belonging to an anonymous and almost God-like force named Be-
ing. In other words: Exactly the same interpretation as the modernist 
reading, only praising instead of criticizing the conclusions. Thirdly, 
the left-Heideggerians4, who also put an emphasis on the passive and 
event-like depiction of man, but not because they point at the event 
of meaning, but because the same event always also produces empty 
spaces, openings, differences (Being as absence) creating possibilities 
for social inclusion and justice. In other words: What these very dif-
ferent interpretations have in common is an understanding of Heide-
gger’s turn according to which the turn is a turn to a more passive 
conception of man as a receiver of meaning, and what separates them 
is how they evaluate this conception.
In this article I shall present a different reading of Heidegger’s 
philosophy after the turn, claiming that whatever is at stake after the 
turn it is not a simple shift from activity to passivity. Instead, I shall 
argue that Heidegger seeks a new way to answer the Seinsfrage, a way 
leading him to introduce the idea of what I shall call pre-projective 
meaning. This may come across as a very passive description of man 
and meaning insofar as Heidegger before the turn identified man’s 
activity with the existential-temporal organization of meaning. How-
ever, I shall argue that, despite the pre-projective conception of mean-
ing, Heidegger succeeds in retaining a space for human activity and 
responsibility vis-à-vis man’s capacity to respond to and be respon-
sive for the pre-projective meaning given to us. On this background, 
the overall aim of this article is to present a third position between 
the right- and left Heideggerians claiming that the late Heidegger in-
troduces an understanding of human activity/freedom, which on the 
one hand (similarly to the right-Heideggerians) puts an emphasis on 
the gift from Being, the meaning of what there is, while on the other 
hand (similarly to the left Heideggerians) that Being also brings us 
an openness for making a critical stance toward its own gift possible. 
In order to work out this reading I have to examine the Seinsfrage and 
how Heidegger answers it before and after the turn.     
1. THE SEINSFRAGE
When claiming that the Seinsfrage is the enduring question in Heideg- 
ger’s thinking, I follow both Heidegger himself, Gadamer5, Richard-
son6 as well as more recent readings such as Capobianco7 who all claim 
that the Seinsfrage is the enduring matter in Heidegger’s thinking both 
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before and after the turn. So, what is the Seinsfrage about? In my view, 
Capobianco gives us a fine indication when he writes:   
“This “it”, that “gives” (gibt) so richly and so inexhaustibly is Be-
ing itself (Sein selbst) as the temporal-spatial emerging and shin-
ing-forth of beings in their beingness as gathered in the ensem-
ble. Being as “manifestness” or “manifestation” (Offenbarkeit), 
this is the matter itself (die Sache selbst) of Heidegger’s thought 
– which, remarkably enough, is at risk of being “forgotten” all 
over again.”8 
In other words: In Capobianco’s reading Heidegger’s Seinsfrage con-
cerns what we could call the dimension or space of appearance/uncon-
cealment/manifestation as such. To explain what this is about, we can 
begin with the fact that Heidegger often repeats the Leibnizian ques-
tion of why there is something and not simply nothing. This question 
puzzled Heidegger throughout his thinking. In Heidegger’s version 
this question is (of course) not a question about the creation of the 
physical universe, but a post-Kantian question concerning appear-
ance. A rephrasing of the Seinsfrage might therefore sound as follows: 
If Being were pure positivity, there would be nothing appearing but 
utter opaqueness. Therefore, to ask why there is something appear-
ing and not nothing is also to ask, why there is both something and 
nothing, i.e. how is the inner constitution of the space of appearance, 
when it contains both positivity and negativity? Why and how is there 
someone to whom the things and I itself appears? In my view, every-
thing in Heidegger serves to answer this question, including seem-
ingly existentialistic stuff, interpretations of poems etc. Accordingly, I 
also agree when Wrathall in the same line of thought argues:
“The question in individuating and understanding ontological 
structures was always “what does this contribute to opening up 
a world and letting entities show up as the things they are?”. Put 
differently, “what disclosive function does it perform?’”9 
Heidegger was occupied throughout his life with the question why 
and how the dimension of manifestation is and why it has been for-
gotten both in everyday life and within the history of philosophy. Sup-
posing Wrathall is right, which I take him to be, an integrated part 
of the Seinsfrage concerns how the Seinsvergessenheit, the concealment 
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and withdrawal of unconcealment, contributes to the unconcealment 
of Being. Therefore, the Seinsfrage concerns how unconcealment hap-
pens, and an integrated part of that question concerns the way in 
which concealing itself as such contributes to the process of uncon-
cealment.
Now, turning to the turn, it was already indicated above that 
Heidegger’s turn is often interpreted as the turn from Dasein to Sein, 
and it is common among scholars more or less to accept Heidegger’s 
own explanation, namely that the direction of questioning in Being and 
Time (BT ) was the right one, namely the Seinsfrage, though its answer-
ing remained too confined within the horizon of subjectivity. On the 
one hand, I agree on this point. On the other hand, I think it is valu-
able to investigate the question from the perspective of the Seinsfrage 
itself. Or, to put it a bit differently: From the perspective of the late 
Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics it is of course easy to argue what 
was needed in BT. But to what extent is it possible to identify an inner 
tension in BT between the Seinsfrage and the basic assumptions in BT 
constituting the space of possible answers, which might have initiated 
the turn from within the position of BT? The aim of the next part is 
to argue that it is possible to identify such a tension as well as to show 
how the turn itself can be interpreted as a response to this tension.
2. THE SEINSFRAGE BEFORE THE TURN 
– THE TEMPORALITY OF EXISTENCE AS THE 
PROJECTIVE ORGANIZATION OF APPEARANCE 
In order to identify this tension in BT, we have to consider how Heide-
gger answers the Seinsfrage in BT, i.e. how BT explains why there is 
something and not nothing. So how did Heidegger answer this ques-
tion in BT? Is BT even trying to answer this question? Is it not about 
mortality, anxiety and inauthenticity? And what do those ‘existential’ 
phenomena have to do with the Leibnizian question? To see the con-
nection between the Seinsfrage and the more ‘existentialistic’ focus of 
BT, one has to remember that the basic argument in the completed 
part of BT in paraphrase goes like this: To understand Being as such, 
we first have to investigate the Being of that being whose Being has 
such a character that it is aware of and understands its own Being. 
Heidegger calls the Being of this self-aware being ‘existence’ and ar-
gues that Dasein’s basic experience of its own existence is the fact that 
it is and ‘has to be’.10 Later in BT Heidegger concludes that Dasein’s 
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Being is not something opposite to time but, on the contrary, its Be-
ing is time i.e. temporally organized, and its simultaneous openness 
toward future and past confronts it with how it is to be itself. In other 
words: the connection between the Seinsfrage and the existentialistic 
scope in BT consists in the fact that Being manifests itself through 
Dasein’s temporally structured being (existence), which opens Dasein 
to the ‘there is’ and thereby also to the I itself and the many different 
beings in the world.
For now, I shall not go any further into the description of the 
relation between future/understanding, past/mood, etc. What is 
of importance here is that Heidegger at this point took the reten-
tion-protention structure he was already familiar with from Husserl’s 
analytics of the inner time-consciousness, arguing that every now al-
ways already also contains something which is by not being anymore 
and something which is by having not yet been. On this line of argu-
ment, Husserl was already suggesting an explanation of time as the 
unity of presence and absence, i.e. positivity and negativity.
However, Heidegger was not satisfied with Husserl’s epistemo-
logical framework. Therefore he transformed it hermeneutically/ex-
istentially which again led to the Care-structure of existence and its 
temporal organization. Thus, Heidegger dismissed Husserl’s account 
of man’s access to what there is, i.e. the opening of the is, since Hus-
serl claims that our access is constituted epistemically vis-à-vis our 
capacity to remember and anticipate the movement of an inner or 
outer object, say a cat crossing a road. Heidegger, for his part, argues 
that the world to which we have access, the is, is not a neutral world of 
objects, but a lifeworld, a world of practice/freedom. And this world is 
not primarily opened by our capacity to remember and anticipate the 
change of objects, but because we are engaged in the world vis-à-vis 
our existentiality i.e. how the I projects itself in and as time. Therefore, 
according to Heidegger in BT, there is something appearing and not 
nothing because Dasein’s Being is temporally organized, and this time 
has the structure of existence or Care (Sorge).
At this point, it is now of further importance that a part of the 
Seinsfrage concerns the possibility of philosophy itself, which Heideg-
ger in BT conceives of as the understanding of Being as such. In this 
regard, Heidegger paid special attention to the question concerning 
what he termed Seinsvergessenheit; that is why Being as such, through-
out the history of philosophy, was ‘forgotten’ by being interpreted as 
a-temporal (despite Being’s temporal character). On this background, 
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we can reconstruct some of the most important assumptions in BT 
concerning the relation between life and philosophy as follows:
a. Every understanding of something as something is founded in 
the temporal Care-structure of existence – also the understand-
ing inherent in philosophy.
b. The analysis of human existence showed that man flees from his 
own mortality/temporality in everyday life. The everyday way 
of forgetting Being.
c. Therefore, man has to fight against his own tendency to flee 
from himself. Authenticity.
d. Since every understanding, also the one inherent in philosophy, 
is grounded in Dasein’s Care-structure, the tendency in Dasein 
to flee from its own mortality/temporality repeats itself on the 
level of philosophy, because of which man as conducting philos-
ophy has to avoid the tendency to Seinsvergessenheit. Fundamen-
tal ontology. 
As it is well-known, Heidegger did not write the last parts of BT, but 
even today it is still rather disputed, exactly why Heidegger never 
wrote it; what initiated the turn. In this regard it has been discussed 
intensely how to interpret Heidegger’s turn: Did he get some new 
insights after BT which made him depart from the line of thought 
in BT (Young11); did he recognize that the project as such was not re-
alizable within the framework laid out in BT (Figal12); was the turn 
a part of the plan already in BT (von Hermann13); or did he return 
to some early insights which were put away in BT (van Buren14)? In 
a certain sense, I think most of these views, although they seem to 
contradict each other, point out important aspects of the turn, but in 
order to work out my own position, I shall primarily relate to Figal’s 
interpretation which I am in a great depth to.15 According to Figal, 
Heidegger discovers in the Basic Problems-lectures from 192716 that it 
is impossible to backtrack the explicit understanding of Being man-
ifest in philosophy (such as Idea, Substance, Monad, Subject, etc.) to 
the understanding of Being within pre-philosophical life. This is the 
case, since the understanding operating in philosophy is not operat-
ing from the perspective of existence. Instead, philosophy is trying to 
understand practice, as Figal puts it.17 On this background, Figal draws 
two conclusions: 1) The project of BT turned out to be impossible, 
since Heidegger was not able to maintain his assumption that every 
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understanding of Being stems from the Care-configured temporality 
of human Being. 2) The turn and Heidegger’s later philosophy do not 
dismiss his earlier Dasein analytics. Rather, it is a change of focus now 
solely concentrating on the event of philosophy, i.e. our explicit under-
standing of Being as such, which is now approached as a phenomenon 
sui generis.
Despite my inspiration from Figal I propose a slightly different 
interpretation. Figal argues that Heidegger’s turn is initiated as he 
runs into troubles when trying to backtrack the temporality of phi-
losophy to Dasein’s temporal organization. I think this problem is a 
part of the turn, but not the first and primary one. This, instead, has 
to do with the fact that Heidegger discovers/remembers (cf. van Bu-
ren) the difference between being-in-the-world and the ‘world’. The 
difference can be explained as follows: As being-in-the-world Dasein 
always already has a certain, but often vague and implicit, understand-
ing of what it means that there is something at all. And this vague 
understanding of the totality of Being is not reducible to Dasein’s 
thrown-throwing projections of understanding; rather it is there as a 
kind of background condition making Dasein’s everyday projections 
possible. In this sense, we can say that the ‘world’ is the understanding 
of what there is before man has any projective intention with it when 
being-in-the-world. The consequence Heidegger draws from this in-
sight is that the opening of and understanding of the is and of the 
world does not have projective character. Compared with Figal I shall 
therefore make the additional claim that what initiates the turn is not 
only that Heidegger seeks to explain philosophy as a phenomenon sui 
generis but also that Heidegger changes the focus of philosophy in or-
der to understand the event of the pre-projective meaning of Being as 
such. As we shall see, Heidegger’s alternative to his former Care-struc-
ture is his concept of truth as aletheia, that is the process of appearance 
explained as an event irreducible to anything else nor explainable in 
any definite vocabulary, since it concerns the dimension of appearance 
and thereby meaning and understandability as such. 
3. THE SEINSFRAGE AFTER THE TURN 
– THE TEMPORALITY OF TRUTH AS THE 
PRE-PROJECTIVE EVENT OF APPEARANCE 
In BT Heidegger attempted to answer the Seinsfrage by working out 
the structure and dynamics of Dasein. Therefore: as Heidegger breaks 
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away from Dasein as the explanatory resource to explain appearance, 
he finds himself in need of finding another way to explain the event 
of appearance – since there is in fact something and not only nothing. 
Now in order to do that, Heidegger after the turn makes different 
attempts, among which the most important are his concept of truth 
and later ‘das Geviert’. Within this article, I shall stick to his concept 
of truth (which he works out for the first time in a lecture given in 
1930), since his concept of truth is what replaces the Care-structure as 
the answer to the Seinsfrage, while the fourfold belongs to his very late 
philosophy. In order to follow the movement of the turn it is therefore 
most obvious to choose the concept of truth as interpretative target.    
In this regard, I have elsewhere made a much more compre-
hensive reading of Heidegger’s concept of truth18, and at this point 
I therefore allow myself just to reconstruct Heidegger’s thoughts on 
truth with a special focus on what I above termed ‘the pre-projec-
tive understanding of Being’. So how does Heidegger account for this 
pre-projective understanding (the interpretational outset is the text 
On the Essence of Truth in GA 9)?
As in BT, truth is a matter of appearance, of coming into sight. 
However, there is a difference between that something is and what it is. 
Like in BT Heidegger still argues that in order for anything to appear 
as this or that, the most primordial level of appearance must reside at 
the level of pure possibility/openness. In BT it is argued that we have 
experiential access to this primordial level within the mood of anxiety, 
which, together with conscience, plays a central role in the transition 
from inauthenticity to authenticity. Hence, in What is Metaphysics, 
anxiety plays an even more central role, but we also see a change in 
‘the what’ of anxiety, since the what of anxiety in WiM is not so much 
the experience of the naked being-in-the-world i.e. Dasein’s confron-
tation with its own being possible. Instead, the what of anxiety in 
WiM is the experience of the ontological difference between Being 
and beings, so that man in anxiety is confronted with the gap be-
tween on the one hand the naked (that is; un-interpreted) ‘that there 
is something at all’ and the naked beings (including him- or herself), 
on the other. As such, Heidegger’s interpretation of anxiety mirrors 
the turn’s shift in focus from being-in-the-world to Being/the world 
as such. However, the anxious experience in WiM of the meaningless-
ness of everything is not how things and life used to appear to man, 
since beings usually appear as understandable/meaningful. Therefore, 
Heidegger concludes that the everyday appearing of beings hides or 
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covers its own ontological past. On this background, Heidegger ar-
gues in summa as follows:
a. the state of openness and indeterminateness is the most pri-
mordial state within the process of appearing
b. this state is not experienced in everyday life (but exclusively in 
the mood of anxiety)
c. therefore, the primordial state of openness must have been cov-
ered in everyday awareness
d. since we do not take any notice of all this; since we just take the 
world and the beings to be as they appear, the process of cover-
ing must in itself be covered i.e. withdraw itself.
For those reasons, Heidegger chooses to make use of the Greek un-
derstanding of truth as a-letheia in order to explain the process of un-
concealment. The use of the alpha privativum underscores that every 
truth-taking of something as something contains a kind of double 
negation. Not a Hegelian one, however, since what is negated in the 
event of truth is firstly the constitutive and primordial openness/pos-
sibility of meaning. So, something determined becomes unconcealed 
by concealing the earlier indeterminateness. However, how is this 
original state negated? How does the change from nothing to some-
thing happen? Heidegger answers after the turn by claiming that the 
transition happens when man is ‘given’ or ‘receives’ meaning making 
it possible to take something as something. Or, to put it a bit dif-
ferently: Every time man comes up with a new idea, that is thinks 
something, it does not come up because man wants it or intends it. 
Rather, man wants and intends because he has got/received the idea. 
Heidegger therefore concludes that our understanding of something 
as something is not explainable as a human projection/construction, 
since every projection requires a meaning to project. This now occa-
sions the question, who/what gives this understanding? – but insofar 
as every answer would be given to us from the very same ‘source’, 
Heidegger does not allow us to give any answers. He simply under-
scores that it is not an ontic something. However, what is allowed 
is to describe how it is given to us, which is why Heidegger after the 
turn is focused on working out how the dynamics of unconcealment 
happens. On this background, we can term this first negation or con-
cealment within the process of truth/unconcealment the metaphysi-
cal-apophantic negation of the openness as such, since it concerns the 
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transition from indeterminateness to determinateness, and it seems 
to me that one of Heidegger’s decisive insight constituting the turn 
was that the meaning of something as something is not a human pro-
jection/performance, but something given to man from the giving it. 
The second negation is the negation of the first negation i.e. the 
metaphysical-apophantic negation. This might sound a bit strange, 
but what Heidegger wants to highlight with his focus on the second 
negation is why beings in our everyday life do not appear in apophan-
tic as-if-brackets, i.e. why we do not just see/understand beings as if 
they were like this or that but simply as they are. In other words, if the 
second negation was not performed, everybody would walk around 
not believing in what they were thinking, seeing, talking about etc. 
since we would know that every ‘as’ was founded in the constitut-
ing nothingness. Accordingly, concerning that part of the Seinsfrage 
focusing on the Seinsvergessenheit, Heidegger changes his view signifi-
cantly after the turn, since Seinsvergessenheit is no longer explained as a 
kind of existential weakness caused by man’s anxiety vis-à-vis his own 
mortality, but rather as an integrated moment within the process of 
unconcealment as such.
Therefore, compared to BT we can point out at least two central 
changes after the turn: Firstly, that both the process of unconcealment 
and the product of the unconcealment, the apophantic as, are not tak-
en to be produced by Dasein’s projective activity. Instead, unconceal-
ment as such and what is unconcealed, i.e. our positive understanding 
of beings, are given to man through the pre-projective event of mean-
ing. Secondly and additionally, insofar unconcealment is explained as 
a pre-projective process, Seinsvergessenheit is in a corresponding way no 
longer explained as a product of Dasein’s projective activity, but as an 
indispensable part of the process of unconcealment as such.     
***
At this point we can now return to the claim that Heidegger preserves 
a space for activity/freedom in his late philosophy. For in which sense 
is it possible to talk about activity in relation to unconcealment as a 
pre-projective process? Isn’t pre-projectiveness almost the definition 
of passivity? In order to answer that question, we have to look more 
carefully at how Heidegger describes the relation between Being and 
man. He writes:
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“Offenbar ist der Mensch etwas Seiendes. Als dieses gehört er 
wie der Stein, der Baum und der Adler in das Ganze des Seins. 
Gehören heißt hier noch: eingeordnet in das Sein. Aber das 
Auszeichnende des Menschen beruht darin, dass er als das den-
kende Wesen, offen dem Sein, vor dieses gestellt ist, auf das Sein 
bezogen bleibt und ihm so entspricht. Der Mensch ist eigentlich 
dieser Bezug der Entsprechung, und er ist nur dies. […] Solches 
An-wesen braucht das Offene einer Lichtung und bleibt so durch 
dieses Brauchen dem Menschenwesen übereignet.”19
What is Heidegger saying here? As I see it, Heidegger’s guiding intu-
ition is that nothing ‘comes to my mind’ because I want, desire, dream 
it etc., since what appears, appears from itself, and in the specific con-
figuration it appears. That is; I do not decide what I think – instead 
Being gives me something to think – and to project. In other words: 
Not even nothing could appear without man, since the openness of 
the clearing both requires Being and man: Being and beings as those, 
which manifest themselves; man as the one to whom the appearance 
happens, the one who receives this or that understanding of a giv-
en situation. To witness the appearing of Being and beings is what 
Heidegger calls ‘thinking’, i.e. the historical (but non-constructive) 
experience of what there is (non-constructive in the sense that man 
does not contribute to the historical formation of understanding).
But then one has to consider, whether this makes Heidegger vul-
nerable toward commentators such as Pippin and Habermas, who claim 
that the late Heidegger presents man too passively in his relation to 
Being, only an echo, ready to obey the SS-orders from Being, as Haber-
mas puts it. However, due to his critique of metaphysics Heidegger 
was very careful when it comes to descriptions of man as be ‘free’, ‘re-
sponsible’ etc. since those labels would have meant a regression to an 
onto-metaphysical vocabulary. But Heidegger does something else: 
he introduces a more poetic language in order to talk about that which 
we cannot talk about adequately in the language of metaphysics, and 
through this more poetic language Heidegger describes man’s relation 
to Being by different agrarian metaphors, such as being a shepherd20, 
cultivating (hegen und flegen) etc. Hence, being neither a shepherd 
nor a farmer (despite growing up in the countryside) I shall claim that 
neither is only passively looking at nature. Instead, we can say that it 
is a ‘physical’ condition for the shepherd and the farmer that they only 
have the animals and the crops which they receive from the earth, and 
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there is nothing they can do but wait until they have something deliv-
ered from earth. But how they receive the gifts of earth, dwelling and 
care-taking, or with the technical urge to control, and what they do to 
and with the gifts is what makes the difference between the good and 
the bad shepherd/farmer. In this sense, the shepherd and the farmer 
are assigned to what comes from the earth, while they are still able to 
make a difference depending on their capacity to receive and assess 
how to handle what has been given to them. This, of course, occasions 
further questions such as what motivates one to respond and assess as 
one does; in which way is there a relation between response and what 
afterwards is given to man? I have to save those questions for later. 
Instead, I shall conclude that despite the fact that the late Heidegger 
avoids any metaphysically laden concepts such as freedom, power, re-
sponsibility etc., he does not present man as purely passive and irre-
sponsible in relation to Being. On the contrary, I would say. What he 
does is to work out a language beyond metaphysics which is able to 
address what it is like to be a person when we do not come up with our 
own thoughts, wishes etc., while still having some kind of ‘influence’ 
on and dialogue with our own thoughts and actions.
Accordingly, I think that neither the right- nor the left-Heideg- 
gerians are completely correct in their readings. On the one hand, 
Heidegger does highlight and affirm what is sent to us from Being (the 
position of the right-Heideggerians), but on the other side he does not 
claim that man is passively forced to accept everything sent from Be-
ing (what the left-Heideggerians problematize in Heidegger). Instead, 
he emphasizes that being human is always already to be confronted 
with the question how one will respond to that which has been given 
to him in the pre-projective mode of understanding. In that sense the 
late Heidegger develops a position, which is not as conservative as 
some might like, but also not as revolutionary as others might prefer. 
Instead, the position offers us a language of and an awareness about 
what human activity and responsibility etc. is, when man is not con-
trolling but also not being controlled by his own understanding.              
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to argue that Heidegger’s turn and its in-
herent shift in focus from Dasein to Sein is not identical with a simple 
shift from activity to passivity. In order to argue that, I claimed, with 
many other interpreters, that the Seinsfrage, how there is something 
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and not nothing, is the enduring question in Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Additionally, it was argued that the decisive difference between be-
fore and after the turn is that Heidegger before the turn answers the 
Seinsfrage by explaining the is as opened by the temporality of Dasein’s 
being, whereby the openness depends on Dasein’s projective activity, 
while Heidegger after the turn claims the openness to be the result of 
what was termed the pre-projective event of meaning. This, however, 
made it obvious, as many have done, to conclude that Heidegger after 
the turn promotes an understanding of man as passive and subjected 
to Being. Against this dominating interpretation of Heidegger’s late 
philosophy, I argued that Heidegger’s emphasis on the pre-projective 
constitution of the openness still holds a place for man’s freedom, 
though it is a new way to approach freedom, namely as the question 
about what man is able to do when he is not projecting his own under-
standing, nor in power concerning what he takes to be the case. This, 
however, opened up several further questions concerning the dynamic 
between Being and man, a more precise description of what it then 
means to be ‘active’ etc., but those questions will have to be taken up 
in another contribution.     
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